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The Provenance Problem: Research Methods and Ethics in the Age
of WikiLeaks
CHRISTOPHER DARNTON Naval Postgraduate School, United States
How should political scientists navigate the ethical and methodological quandaries associated withanalyzing leaked classified documents and other nonconsensually acquired sources? Massiveunauthorized disclosures may excite qualitative scholars with policy revelations and quantitative
researchers with big-data suitability, but they are fraught with dilemmas that the discipline has yet to
resolve. This paper critiques underspecified research designs and opaque references in the proliferation of
scholarship with leaked materials, as well as incomplete and inconsistent guidance from leading journals.
It identifies provenance as the primary concept for improved standards and reviews other disciplines’
approaches to this problem. It elaborates eight normative and evidentiary criteria for scholars by which to
assess source legitimacy and four recommendations for balancing their trade-offs. Fundamentally, it
contends that scholars need deeper reflection on source provenance and its consequences, more humility
about whether to access newmaterials and what inferences to draw, andmore transparency in citation and
research strategies.
N ational security leaks engender uncomfortabledilemmas for political leaders, citizens, andscholars. Barack Obama ran a “no drama”
campaign in 2008 with tightly controlled communica-
tions and as US President prosecuted more leakers
than all his predecessors combined (Dilanian 2019;
Kornblut 2008). Nonetheless, in his final week in office,
Obama commuted the prison sentence of Private First
Class Chelsea Manning, whose leak of hundreds of
thousands of classified documents had harmed US
diplomatic relations, security, and intelligence, accord-
ing to Obama’s secretaries of state and defense
(Clinton 2014, 252, 368, 552–5; Gates 2014, 425–8;
Savage 2017). The subsequent administration was fur-
ther plagued by leaks and security breaches, often to
Donald Trump’s ire, but frequently also at his instiga-
tion (Haberman and Rogers 2018; Rosenberg and
Schmitt 2017). Although Trump repeatedly praised
WikiLeaks while campaigning in 2016 (and earned
the moniker “leaker in chief” from his staff), his raft
of pardons after losing reelection four years later
excluded Manning’s collaborator, WikiLeaks founder
Julian Assange (Healy, Sanger, and Haberman 2016,
2018; Helderman, Dawsey, and Reinhard 2021; Parker
and Sanger 2016). These cases challenge citizens to
define justice and balance national security and the
public interest, especially when leaked information
includes not simply insider gossip but classified mate-
rial. Scholars, too, debate the ethics of leaking and
government secrecy (e.g., Cohen, Farrell, and Finne-
more 2014; Feaver, Stanger, and Walzer 2018).
How should researchers approach the informational
fallout from such leaks? The consequences and analytical
challenges of treating unauthorized disclosures as social-
science evidence are extensive, complex, and underexa-
mined (see, presciently, Drezner 2010). Political scientists
who have addressed leaked documents’ research utility
advocate freedom of inquiry, tout possible empirical
revelations, and decry self-censorship (Gill and Spirling
2015; Michael 2015; O’Loughlin 2016) or emphasize
human-subjects protections during research (Boustead
and Herr 2020). In contrast, I argue that despite appear-
ing to offer bountiful evidence, unauthorized sources are
flawed and dangerous temptations, to which political
science has too frequently and casually succumbed.
As with artworks and artifacts, how documents
change hands after creation affects their meaning and
value, with possessors and observers participating in
the objects’ social history (Appadurai 1986, 34, 41–2,
56; cf. Higonnet 2013, 199–202). Sources’ provenance,
their history of possession and transmission, generates
methodological and ethical issues for researchers.
These are especially acute when we recognize that
specific works were, ultimately, stolen. Nonconsensual
acquisition of documents complicates their analysis,
raising questions of authenticity, legality, and selection
bias.Moreover, engagement with those texts can repro-
duce real-world harms and condone security and pri-
vacy violations. As Baroness Ruth Deech argued in
support of British legislation for restitution of cultural
objects looted by the Nazis,
Art is an ethical issue. Displaying looted art, once it is
known to be such, is not just an invasion of privacy and a
demonstration that wrongdoers may indeed profit from
their crimes; it is also putting on show something that the
owners never meant to be seen in such circumstances. It
has ceased to be an object of beauty and one thatmuseums
can be proud of or use for educational and aesthetic
aims… . It taints the spectators who knowingly take
advantage of the presence of the picture there and it
speaks to them of loss and war, not creativity and insight.
It is a well-known principle in physics that the act of
observation changes the object observed and there is
something of that principle in our viewing of looted art.
(UK Parliament 2009; cf. Besterman 2014, 20–2)
Christopher Darnton , Associate Professor, Department of
National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, United States,
cndarnto@nps.edu.
Received: October 21, 2020; revised: April 01, 2021; accepted:
November 05, 2021.
1
Assange and his kindred are not the art-looting
accomplices of Hitler and Göring, but disciplines such
as art history have transformed their ethical practices
regarding provenance in postwar and postcolonial con-
texts in ways that are instructive for social scientists.
Given the proliferation of nonconsensually obtained
evidence in security studies, particularly leaked classi-
fied documents, we should no longer elide the prove-
nance problem but confront it to develop new
standards.
This is an apt moment for reflection on documentary
source legitimacy. First, the decade-long accumulation
of published research since Manning’s leaks is ripe for
critical review. This work is pervasive and problematic:
as I demonstrate, more than a hundred articles have
employed leaked sources, in every leading journal, but
only rarely with prominent disclosure and clear cita-
tions, let alone explicit discussion of evidentiary or
ethical issues. Second, absent clear disciplinary stan-
dards, these publications steadily build norms that
tacitly endorse further use of leaked sources and
encourage future disclosures. Active deliberation of
this trend is overdue: scholars concerned about leaked
documents should contest their usage rather than just
silently refraining from citing them. Third, the concrete
problem of WikiLeaks in security studies should
engage political science conversations on transparency
and replication (Jacobs et al. 2021; Rinke and Wuttke
2021), and research ethics particularly regarding
human subjects (APSA 2020; Boustead and Herr
2020; Kapiszewski and Wood 2021; Subotić 2021).
How to handle primary-source evidence is increasingly
recognized as a widespread and pressing concern.
In this paper, I first establish the problem’s scope,
outlining my journal sample and methodology and
presenting descriptive data on publication patterns
regarding leaked sources. Second, I critique existing
guidance on source legitimacy from journals and pro-
fessional associations. Third, I examine scholarly arti-
cles’ apparent use of leaked sources, especially
U.S. diplomatic cables, criticizing collective perfor-
mance regarding citation practices, stated research
designs, and ethics discussions. Fourth, I propose the
concept of provenance as a foundation for improved
professional standards, drawing insights from disci-
plines ranging from journalism to paleontology. Fifth,
following John Gerring’s (2001, esp. 22–31) “criterial
framework,” I operationalize eight provenance con-
cerns, two primarily empirical (data richness, data reli-
ability) and six predominantly ethical (legality, national
security, public interest, policy relevance, human-
subjects protections, and reflexivity). Sixth, I offer four
suggestions to manage the inherent trade-offs between
these criteria.
I conclude by urging greater humility, strategy, and
transparency in political scientists’ quest for more and
better data. All sources have a cost. The provenance
problem, as I see it, is that uncritical reliance on con-
veniently accessible but coercively or nonconsensually
acquired documents casts a dark halo over the rest of
our work. Research with such materials should be rare,
prominently disclosed, carefully justified, and
extensively contextualized and cross-checked. Where
scholars find sources and howwe handle and label them
affects what we can ethically and empirically claim and
how others view our work. Scholars will make inde-
pendent judgments in navigating these trade-offs, and
further debate is inevitable. However, this paper clar-
ifies the terms and stakes of those conversations. I float
cautionary buoys over an array of submerged hazards,
and I recommend only judicious departures from the
main channel.
LEAKS IN JOURNALS: METHODOLOGY AND
PUBLICATION PATTERNS
Academic research that uses apparently leaked sources
is widespread, persistent, and prominent. To track
scholarly use of leaked sources since the Manning
disclosures, I focused on the 20 journals listed in the
2011 William & Mary TRIP (Teaching, Research, and
International Policy) survey (Maliniak, Peterson, and
Tierney 2012; see Table 1). For scholars publishing
WikiLeaks-based research in international relations
and adjacent areas of comparative politics and Amer-
ican national security, this is a strong list of candidate
outlets. It closely overlaps political-science journal
rankings, including those measuring impact through
weighted citations rather than reputation (Garand
and Giles 2007, Tables 3–4), especially among top
journals. I examined each journal’s website for pub-
lished guidelines about leaks, legality, and sources.
I built a dataset of articles mentioning either
“Wikileaks” or “cable” (or both) published 2010–
2020 in those journals. Full-text keyword searches using
EBSCO, JSTOR, Project Muse, and ProQuest data-
bases and publisher websites Sage, Wiley, Taylor &
Francis, IngentaConnect, Lynne Rienner, Brill, Oxford
University Press, and Cambridge University Press
yielded 565 unique articles (see Darnton 2021). Over-
lapping searches produced varying results: not every
portal catches keyword text within footnotes, refer-
ences, hyperlinks, or larger words. I included shorter
pieces (letters, reviews, editorial notes) but excluded
early-view publications. I downloaded each article,
searched its text for both terms, and examined all
footnotes and references, to see whether leaked mate-
rial was apparently cited. I did not access linked sources
but relied on the text of notes and the sentences they
supported. If articles mentioned diplomatic cables or
leaked documents, and source material was unclear, or
articles specifically mentioned online appendices, then
I also consulted these.
From this review, I manually coded each article as
3 (appears directly to cite, quote, or paraphrase leaked
documents and/ormaterial viaWikiLeaks irrespective of
origin), 2 (apparently refers to leaked material solely
secondhand, via published articles rather than primary
sources), or 1 (false positive: mentions the WikiLeaks
organization without engaging leaked material or notes
other cables, whether diplomatic, fiber-optic, or televi-
sion). I also read all 168 code-2 and code-3 articles in
full. In 9% of articles referencing leaked material
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(15/168), it was unclear either whether sources were
primary documents or where they were obtained, so I
also report my coding uncertainty. Among code-3 arti-
cles (n = 116), I recorded whether leaked sources
apparently included United States diplomatic cables.
For those that did, in peer-reviewed journals (n = 64), I
coded further variables including number of cables
cited, whether article body mentioned leaks or only
references (or appendices) revealed this, whether arti-
cles mentioned documents’ classification, what terms
described WikiLeaks’ role, and what information ref-
erences included. The Appendix (see Darnton 2021)
details all relevant information supporting these coding
decisions.
Three findings stand out regarding journal publica-
tion patterns. First, an extensive body of work has
employed leaked material: 116 articles cited it directly
(code-3), and another 52 through secondary sources
(code-2). This assuredly undercounts publications
engaging leaked material including books, disserta-
tions, and additional journals. It is impossible to mea-
sure self-censorship without the denominator,
including scholars who could have cited leaked sources
but declined. The TRIP survey (Maliniak, Peterson,
and Tierney 2012, 44) provides a suggestive glimpse:
15%of scholars admitted usingWikiLeaks for research
(US respondents’ figure was 10%; highest rates were
France, 42%, and New Zealand, 31%). The scholarly
community clearly has not scrupulously avoided Wiki-
Leaks.
Second, by 2018, all 20 journals had published articles
using leaked sources. Two of the most common outlets
are Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs (Table 1)—
editorially, rather than peer-reviewed—focused on cur-
rent events and policy commentary, routinely featuring
nonacademic authors, largely without footnotes. The
most frequent peer-reviewed outlets—International
Affairs, International Security, Security Studies, and
Review of International Studies—comprise more code-3
articles (42) than the other 14 journals combined (39).
Third, the academic use of leaked material is persis-
tent. The temporal pattern might suggest explosive
interest following Manning’s disclosures, gradually
declining thereafter (total column height, Figure 1).
However, Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs drive
much of this (white columns). Among peer-reviewed












Foreign Policy FP 25 0 9 2011
International Affairs IA 14 15 13 2011
International Security IS 10 6 3 2012
Foreign Affairs FA 10 0 4 2011
Security Studies SS 9 4 14 2013
Review of International Studies RIS 9 6 10 2013
International Studies Quarterly ISQ 7 4 2 2012
Global Governance GG 6 1 20 2014
International Studies Review ISR 4 1 17 2013
European Journal of International
Relations
EJIR 3 4 7 2012
International Organization IO 3 0 1 2017
Review of International Political
Economy
RIPE 3 1 15 2012
American Political Science Review APSR 2 1 5 2016
Comparative Politics CP 2 1 19 2017
International Relations IR 2 0 18 2015
Journal of Peace Research JPR 2 1 16 2017
World Politics WP 2 2 6 2013
American Journal of Political Science AJPS 1 1 12 2015
Journal of Conflict Resolution JCR 1 2 8 2016
Millennium: Journal of International
Studies
MIL 1 2 11 2011
FIGURE 1. Articles Using Leaked Material
The Provenance Problem: Research Methods and Ethics in the Age of WikiLeaks
3
journals (black columns), direct engagement with leaks
suggests the opposite: a gradual increase or steady
annual production averaging nine articles, allowing a
three-year research lag after the 2010 disclosures. The
year 2016 saw the most peer-reviewed code-3 articles
and 2019 the second-most. Additionally, rather than all
journals publishing such work shortly after Manning’s
leaks, several only did so more recently (Table 1): eight
published their first such articles during 2011–2012, five
during 2013–2014, four during 2015–2016, and three in
2017.
JOURNALS ON LEAKS: UNEVEN GUIDANCE
ABOUT SOURCES
Research methods and ethics are matters of shared
concern. Scholarly articles pass through peer review
and editorial scrutiny, with a penumbra of responsibil-
ity regarding research ethics, legality, and scientific
merit for journal editors, reviewers, publishers, and
institutions. Thus, for context before evaluating how
articles employed leaked sources, I review the limited
and conflicting guidance available to their authors.
Academic associations and journals offer ambiva-
lent stances, a decade afterManning’s disclosures. The
International Studies Association (n.d.; cf. Michael
2015, 176) professes willingness to publish research
with still-classified documents but expresses “regret”
that “some media are reporting otherwise,” thereby
recognizing that confusion is still rife; moreover, that
ISA “does not have a policy rejecting” such work (due
partly to the “cross-national, global complexity” of
legal liability) is different than affirmatively defending
such material’s legitimacy. The American Political
Science Review (2016) explains that it “will review
papers that employ data whose legality is in
question,” yet passes responsibility onto authors,
who “need to ascertain that they may legally use the
data prior to the article appearing in print.” Editorial
interest in leaked documents’ intellectual potential
complicates this guidance: as the APSR editors noted
(2017, iii), “One manifestation of ‘big data’ are (sic)
massive data leaks, such as the Panama Papers or the
US embassy cables”; an article employing Chinese
government documents “illustrates how to use a mas-
sive data leak to answer social science questions,” so
editors “expect to see this research expanded to inves-
tigate other regimes.”
Ethics are not reducible to legality, though. As the
American Political Science Association (2020, 17–8)
maintains regarding human-subjects research, scholars
“should generally comply” with applicable laws and
ethical “requirements may go beyond what the law …
may require”; conversely, researchers may violate laws
given “reasoned justification … based on ethical stan-
dards rather than convenience.” APSA’s (2020, 1) call
for “openness and broader discussion” on research
ethics is promising, and APSA and ISA deserve credit
for posting even these limited guidelines. The other
15 TRIP-ranked peer-reviewed journals offer no public
position regarding leaked sources, despite having
published such research. The World Politics (2018, 7)
style sheet, though, explains how to format references
to what it calls a “WikiLeaks cable.”Ultimately, clearer
positions on data legitimacy would help researchers
resolve friction between laws and research ethics and
slippage between treatment of human subjects and
written documents.
LEAKS IN ARTICLES
How have scholars proceeded in the absence of those
standards? If leaks produce self-authenticating, excel-
lent evidence, with negligible ethics concerns, then
readers might expect robust defense of sources’
research value, extensive documentary engagement,
and detailed citations. Conversely, if scholars have
concerns about sources’ legitimacy or reliability, then
readers might anticipate discussion of trade-offs and
justifications. Either way, it should be straightforward
—but is frequently challenging—to determine whether,
why, and how scholars employed leaked material.
This criticism is not intended to name and shame
individual authors, especially junior scholars, particu-
larly since the explosion of online sources and the fog of
ethics are so recent. Current guidance for authors is
conflicting—and researchers, reviewers, and editors
weighing these issues a decade ago had even less to
work with. In this section, therefore, I highlight overall
source usage trends rather than criticizing particular
articles; the Appendix (Darnton 2021) provides infor-
mation at the article level. (I also exclude Foreign
Policy and Foreign Affairs, focusing on peer-reviewed
journals.) Establishing patterns of practice regarding
leaked documents and gaps between what articles say
and what footnotes indicate demonstrates the urgency
of further ethical and methodological discussion. Six
issues are particularly salient.
MISCELLANEOUS ORIGINS
Articles cited diverse leaked and hacked sources: corpo-
rate and governmental, US and foreign, military and
civilian, domestic and diplomatic. Corporations include
Stratfor, DynCorp, Blackwater, and multinationals
doing business in Luxembourg. Documents appear
from the governments of India and France, the United
Nations High Commission on Refugees, and the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan). Several
US agencies are included: US Trade Representative, US
military video footage from Iraq, Joint Task Force-
Guantánamo documents, the Iraq and Afghanistan
“War Logs,” Congressional Research Service reports,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emails, State Depart-
ment incident reports from Iraq, Coalition Provisional
Authority files, and Navy and CIA memoranda. Articles
using leaks indirectly (code-2) suggest additional sources
from China, Britain, Albania, Venezuela, the “Palestine
Papers” and “tunileaks,” alleged US intelligence files
leaked by Edward Snowden, and John Podesta’s emails.
Deciding what sources are fair game and which are
off-limits for analysts is not a one-time problem from
Christopher Darnton
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the Manning disclosures. However, more than three-
quarters of peer-reviewed code-3 articles (64/81)
apparently employed at least one leakedUS diplomatic
cable; comparing these articles yields insights on how
scholars addressed the dilemmas of leaked sources.
FEW SOURCES
Of the 60 peer-reviewed articles referencing identifi-
able cables (disregarding two with specific cables only
in appendices and two with cables not individually
listed), half (30) cited a single cable, another eighth
(8 articles) only two, and just a third (22, 37%) cited
three or more (Figure 2). The top quintile (12/60) cited
more cables than the rest combined. Published refer-
ences may not reflect the extent of research conducted,
though. Nor does citation quantity alone indicate ana-
lytical quality: specific projects or inferences might
obtain great value from a single document (Bennett
and Checkel 2015, 16–8).
However, readers need to know how and why
authors approached a quarter-million cables, only to
extract isolated citations. Further, given leaked docu-
ments’ ethical concerns, scholars should consider
whether they could perform substantially the same
analysis without touching leaked sources at all. If this
sparse evidence is unavailable elsewhere, and crucial
for authors’ analysis, that should be clearly indicated.
Without clear methodological rationales, I find per-
plexing the frequency of uncritical reliance on solitary
documents from a voluminous and problematic corpus.
INCOMPLETE DISCLOSURES
In most cases (37/64 articles, 58%), readers would have
no idea that leaked sources were used or WikiLeaks
accessed, without checking notes, references, or appen-
dices. Placing source and inference discussion in foot-
notes is often reasonable, especially to maintain case-
study narratives. However, if authors engage sensitive
or illegal material, prominent disclosure and discussion
in body text would help. Moreover, when articles men-
tion using archival sources, government documents, or
diplomatic cables but do not clarify that these included
leaks, then stated research methods are misleading.
Similarly, only one-fifth of articles (13/64), even in
footnotes or appendices, mentioned document classifi-
cation (yet apparently cited classified material any-
way); eighty percent cited similar documents either
without recognizing, or acknowledging, that status.
And, disregarding mentions of “WikiLeaks,” just
one-third (21/64) noted their sources’ leaked nature.
Four articles, to their credit, acknowledged both leaked
and classified aspects; thirty-four (53%) did neither.
Neglect of document classification or leaks suggests
incomplete understanding or analysis of source mate-
rial, undermining empirical persuasiveness; conversely,
disclosure of classified and unauthorized sources high-
lights the work’s potential ethical precarity, requiring
further authorial justification. (Intentional obscuring of
source provenance would exacerbate both methodo-
logical and ethical problems.)
OPAQUE REFERENCES
Collectively, citations fell short of transparency. Even
when authors indicated leaked cables, hyperlinks to
media outlets or organizations other than WikiLeaks
often left citations unclear regarding whether authors
engaged primary sources or secondary articles. Not all
blame for truncated or misleading references (e.g.,
alphabetized bibliographies attributing cable author-
ship to WikiLeaks, not embassies) falls on authors:
journal style sheets vary, and word count restrictions
and parenthetical reference formats disadvantage doc-
umentary researchers (see Marc Trachtenberg, in
Büthe and Jacobs 2015, 14). But, problems extend
beyond formatting.
Most articles (37/64, 58%) employed at least one
cable where the reference did not identify the location,
the US governmental origin, or the actual document.
FIGURE 2. Articles Using Leaked Cables
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Specifically, nine articles (14%) discussed documents
without citations, provided references without specify-
ing source location, or just noted that texts are in the
author’s possession. If documents are not publicly
available—perhaps obtained from personal contacts
or through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)—this
should be disclosed. Cited documents without listed
locations should be suspect, especially if these might
remain classified or proprietary. Twenty-seven articles
(42%; one overlaps with the previous nine) had at least
one citation with a clear repository but unspecified
government origin, including notes with unaccompa-
nied hyperlinks and detailed WikiLeaks citations that
omitted US authorship. Even if sources are linked and
discoverable for replication, vague or implicit identifi-
cation undermines persuasiveness.
Only three articles (/64, <5%), when citing appar-
ently leaked cables, met three basic criteria: author
(“Embassy X”), recipient (“State”), and document
location (“WikiLeaks, [URL]”). Diplomatic cables
are strategic communications, numbered in series, at
specific classification levels, from embassies or consul-
ates to the State Department and vice versa, written by
and often addressed to individual diplomats, on speci-
fied topics. Good citations include this information and
where authors found the source. Because our refer-
ences do not sufficiently convey that communicative
context, our analysis may fail to capture it as well.
RARE RATIONALES
Why did scholars employ leaked material, and how did
they address concerns about document legitimacy or
reliability? Among 22 peer-reviewed articles citing
three or more leaked cables, where WikiLeaks was
evidently part of the research strategy, explicit meth-
odological discussion of leaked documents’ prospective
empirical utility or limitations is sparse. Only one arti-
cle extensively addresses document reliability: Elias
(2018, 24–44) triangulates between leaked and public
sources, considers what information might remain clas-
sified, and argues, “it is reasonable to expect the Wiki-
leaks records to be representative of” the “diplomatic
processes” the article investigates. Predominantly,
though, articles citing leaked cables apparently treated
them as straightforward reflections of US policy or host
country conditions.
Moreover, none of the 64 peer-reviewed articles
employing leaked cables expressed ethical reserva-
tions, provided normative justifications, or mentioned
potential illegality. Many scholars may not be contem-
plating sources’ context and consequences or not dis-
closing this. Selection bias could be involved if
researchers with ethical concerns simply avoid leaks.
However, even authors without such qualms ought to
defend their research strategies.
Some articles citing leaked documents other than
cables provided clearer ethical position taking. One
analyzes videos purportedly documenting human-
rights violations by US forces in Iraq (Tidy 2017); leaks
show “how dominant accounts of war can be compli-
cated and contested” and howmultiple perspectives are
“called upon as legitimate conduits for truths about war
and are variously written into or out of accounts of war”
(96–7). Further, Tidy (2017, 96–8, 102–5) critiques
WikiLeaks’ video editing and other source interven-
tions, to resist taking official US stories or WikiLeaks
counternarratives at face value. Another assembles
data from leaked Joint Task Force-Guantánamo doc-
uments regarding detainees (Deutschmann 2016),
declaring an “urgent need” for research on “prisoner
treatment” and the consequences of prisoners’ behav-
ior for “how US authorities react.” A third uses US
Trade Representative documents on the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement to analyze normative
aspects of interest representation (Kuyper 2016),
claiming that “interest in exclusion … by governments
and bureaucrats,”with information such as treaty drafts
“deliberately obscured from public view … violates
standards of inclusive democracy” (318).
Notably, these rationales involve human rights and
democracy, emphasizing governmental conduct rather
than just documentary content. I am unconvinced that
normative adherence to democratic deliberation and
government transparency necessarily legitimizes schol-
arship with leaked classifiedmaterials or that the objec-
tive of improving human rights practices justifies any
means of access to evidence. However, explicit autho-
rial reflexivity facilitates more productive ethical
debates than citations without such context.
LEGITIMIZING EUPHEMISMS
Further complicating source assessment is what I see
as legitimizing euphemisms, in 39% of articles (25/64).
One-quarter (16/64) included positive verbs identify-
ing WikiLeaks’ connection to the cables (e.g., pub-
lished, released) or adjectives about those documents’
status other than classified and leaked (e.g., internal,
private). These claims are accurate, particularly along-
side admission of documents’ unauthorized disclosure;
besides, journals may influence citation phrasing.
However, such diction suggests contestable claims
about provenance and WikiLeaks’ legitimacy. Distri-
bution is not declassification, and availability is not
authorization.
More problematic are references to “WikiLeaks
cables,” which almost one-fifth of articles made
(12/64), implying ownership or authorship, neither of
which is true. This shorthand blurs the origin and
disclosure of these sources and complicates scholars’
ability to use them as evidence. The variation or omis-
sion of labels and what I read as hesitation or ambiva-
lence about these documents’ acquisition suggests that
researchers are tiptoeing around the provenance prob-
lem rather than confronting it directly.
PROVENANCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
FOUNDATION
Scholars need to reflect more carefully on the sources
of our sources—rather than simply searching, citing,
and moving on, we need to consider documents’
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provenance. Here, insights from other disciplines
should inform political science research methods.
Despite extensive ethics guidance on interviews, exper-
iments, surveys, and ethnography, political scientists
working with documents are only beginning to chart
this territory (Jacobs and Büthe 2021, esp. 190–1;
Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015, 145–9, 172–
87; Subotić 2021). Andmethods advice on archives and
process tracing focuses on causal, empirical, and logis-
tical concerns, with little attention to ethics (Bennett
and Checkel 2015; Darnton 2018; Frisch et al. 2012).
Even the transparency turn, which advocates precision
on what sources are, why they were selected, and how
they support empirical inferences (and which raises
ethical considerations regarding scholarly opacity),
has not emphasized the legitimacy of underlying data
(Jacobs and Büthe 2021, supplement, II.1, 12–3; Mor-
avcsik 2014, 665–8, 677–8). And leading journals offer
mixed signals. Political science lacks clear bases for
ruling any written sources as being out of bounds.
However, other fields emphasize that where scholars
find a source matters greatly for how it should be
understood—and whether researchers have rights of
possession or access at all. In short, “Provenance is
paramount” (Fraser 2018). Provenance is a major
theme in archival management and archaeology and
in collecting wine, art, books, and antiquities, where
ownership history significantly influences market value
(Gill and Chippindale 2007; Monks-Leeson 2011;
Sweeney 2008). Opaque pathways between production
and possession can render even authentic items worth-
less or fundamentally tainted. And the continued dis-
play of illegitimate objects casts a dubious pall over
entire collections and institutions.
Anthropologists and museum curators reflecting on
these problems increasingly advocate repatriation or
restitution of culturally significant items, coercively or
clandestinely obtained, to their original owners, heirs,
or communities (Besterman 2014; Colwell 2015; La
Follette 2017). Domains with greatest progress on nor-
mative agreement, legal provisions, and actual restitu-
tion along these lines are narrowly circumscribed:
especially Nazi-looted art and cultural objects and
Native American human remains and funerary items.
Beyond these, masses of artifacts in private and public
collections have gaps in provenance or uncomfortable
legacies of looting or coercive exchange. Current
museum practice requires that this history no longer
be overlooked: provenance needs to be highlighted
rather than finessed. Good-faith possession, diligently
researched and openly maintained, can support
objects’ retention, whereas nonconsensual acquisitions
or opacity in investigating or disclosing these under-
mines claims to ownership or stewardship. Restitution
debates over particular objects are contentious (con-
sider the Parthenon Marbles [Doyle 2009; Rudenstine
2002]). Museums can reasonably claim public interest
in display, preservation, and research, as well as realis-
tic challenges in documenting transaction histories, but
they face increased burdens of proof and diminished
presumptions of legitimate possession, as against claims
by previous owners or source communities.
Transparency is now necessary but not sufficient, as
uncovering nonconsensual acquisitions has ethical con-
sequences.
Historians maintain strong professional commit-
ments to archival access and preservation (American
Historical Association n.d, 2, 4), and appear less
inclined than other disciplines to refrain from analyzing
available sources, whatever their provenance. How-
ever, historians insist on deep contextual understand-
ing and critical interpretation of sources, including
sensitivity to archives as intentional collections with
normative and power-laden dimensions. Selective cre-
ation, organization, destruction, and access of docu-
ments privileges some voices and themes and silences
or obscures others—processes that are particularly
salient in the records of colonialism and empire (see
Burton 2005; Trouillot 1995). To read such archives
against the grain requires systematic effort.
These reflections are not confined to the humanities
or interpretivist wings of social science. Biologists and
paleontologists increasingly weigh research revelations
against the problematic origins of their specimens, from
newly discovered blue tarantulas trafficked from
Malaysia to hundred-million-year-old “blood amber”
fossils from Myanmar conflict zones (Hunt 2020;
Nuwer 2019). Fossil excavation in developing coun-
tries, younger scholars argue, should consult with local
populations, involving participation, education, and
repatriation, rather than colonial models of extraction
and exploitation (Elbein 2021). The Society for Verte-
brate Paleontology (2020, 2) has called on journals to
“bemindful when handling manuscripts for publication
that involve fossils from conflict zones” and to ban
research with newly acquired Burmese amber, advising
scholars “not to encourage a black-market for commer-
cial trading,” which empowers violent actors. More-
over, the organization states (ibid.) that a core principle
of paleontology is that only fossils “permanently acces-
sioned and deposited in stable repositories within the
public trust” are legitimate scholarly source material,
whereas private collections “cannot be regarded as
reliably available for study, cannot be considered part
of reproducible science, and must not be introduced in
scientific literature.”
Restraint comes, too, from the American Statistical
Association (2018, 2–4): “The ethical statistician is
candid about any known or suspected limitations,
defects, or biases in the data,” and “In contemplating
whether to participate in an analysis of data from a
particular source, refuses to do so if participating in the
analysis could reasonably be interpreted by individuals
who provided information as sanctioning a violation of
their rights.”Criminal justice, similarly, emphasizes the
consequences of others’ access choices via the chain of
custody: incriminating material (including digital files)
from a suspect’s home might be thrown out of court as
inadmissible if not obtained through lawful search or
not properly handled thereafter; relatedly, material
presented by prosecutors requires authentication
against claims of manipulation, and using even one
piece of fabricated incriminating evidence creates a
presumption of innocence by implying the weakness
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of the prosecution’s case (Goodison, Davis, and Jack-
son 2015; Jones 2010).
Although journalism seems to welcome anonymous
sources and blockbuster disclosures, media ethics actu-
ally identify numerous caveats and countervailing
values, rather than providing blank checks for research.
Professional journalists struggle to establish which
truths are newsworthy and which leaks deserve publi-
cation. The documents they quote or publish are
selected to support specific narratives, stories that
reporters and editors have deliberately decided are in
the public interest and that require exhaustive cross-
checking. Media ethics experts argue that transparency
must be “tempered by a commitment to responsible
publishing and a concern for accuracy, verification, and
minimizing harm” (Ward 2014, 54), along with other
values such as context and support for community
(Horner 2014, 194–200; McBride and Rosenstiel
2014). Moreover, editors consult government agencies
for comment and context for impending stories and
often agree to redact or withhold specific material
(Foreman 2016, 86–7). On national security, journalists
struggle to maintain independence without sacrificing
access—and leaks are sometimes government sanc-
tioned (Seib 2006).
These countervailing pressures affected newspapers’
responses to disclosures brokered by WikiLeaks.
New York Times Executive Editor Bill Keller
expressed concerns (Keller 2011) about Julian
Assange’s motivations and selective withholding, coor-
dinated with the US government about releases and
stories, and sought to protect named US informants
abroad from being endangered by unredacted docu-
ments. Alan Rusbridger (2018, 250, 312), editor-in-
chief of the Guardian, recalled that Assange seemed
happy to release the full tranche of documents from
Manning and “let people around the world pick
through the entrails of U.S. foreign policy,” whereas
theGuardianwanted to be amore selective gatekeeper
of public-interest newsworthiness; later, collaborating
with theNew York Times on Edward Snowden’s leaks,
Rusbridger pushed the Times to agree not to “use the
archive as a bran tub to go fishing for stories unrelated
to Snowden’s primary focus.” Without equally careful
ethical and inferential frameworks, scholars risk
launching illegitimate or even illegal fishing expedi-
tions.
PROVENANCE: A CRITERIAL APPROACH
Several disciplines provide strong reasons to decline
unauthorized sources, and they identify burdens of
disclosure, deep interpretation, and public interest if
scholars decide to proceed. To identify the major eth-
ical and empirical issues at stake and how they conflict
and to build toward disciplinary guidance, I follow John
Gerring’s (2001) “criterial” approach to research
methods. This framework is particularly apt for its
empathetic recognition of inherent trade-offs between
scholarly values rather than a defined “rulebook” (22–
3) while pushing political scientists to articulate their
strategies more explicitly and conscientiously. Ease of
availability is weak justification for research design
(29–30); scholars can disagree, and should make their
case proactively, but they should expect that reviewers
might prioritize other factors (26–7). This approach
also comports with social-science ethics texts that advo-
cate incorporating ongoing ethical practices rather than
focusing narrowly on initial project approval or legal or
Institutional Review Board (IRB) compliance (Fujii
2012; Israel 2015). The core issue, as the seminal Bel-
mont Report (US Department of Health 1979) articu-
lated regarding human-subjects protections, is how to
balance potential harms and benefits throughout
research.
In that spirit, I outline eight criteria for considering
whether and how to analyze documentary sources of
problematic provenance: data richness, data reliability,
legality, national security, public interest, policy rele-
vance, human-subjects protection, and reflexivity. The
first two are primarily methodological, regarding the
evidentiary value and inferential problems associated
with leaked or hacked material. The latter six princi-
pally concern research ethics—the legitimacy, pur-
poses, harms, and benefits of using nonconsensually
obtained sources, and scholars’ positions regarding
documents’ creators and brokers. Researchers may
disagree over which attributes to maximize, but all
approaches come with costs, and readers require per-
suasion. Dilemmas are irresolvable and scholars will
contest fundamental issues such as whether cables on
WikiLeaks’ website are public-interest resources pro-
vided by whistleblowers or illegal materials that could
harm national security and human subjects. Neither
strict adherence to US laws, nor fixation on human-
subjects protections, nor insistence on academic free-
dom, offers a straightforward path out of these quan-
daries.
DATA RICHNESS
There is certainly a case for the evidentiary value of
leaked documents. Focusing on originally classified
material related to policy making reflects existing qual-
itative research methods guidance on process tracing,
archives, and case studies, which emphasizes obtaining
the best available evidence (Bennett and Checkel 2015,
18–9, 25–7; Darnton 2018, 18, 92–3, 110–6; George and
Bennett 2005, 96–107; Trachtenberg 2006, 140–2, 153–
7). Important channels for declassification and docu-
ment release include theForeignRelations of theUnited
States series, mandatory declassification review by
National Archives staff, and FOIA requests by
researchers or institutions such as the National Security
Archive (consult Brandon Rottinghaus in Frisch et al.
2012; Trachtenberg 2006, 252–5). Vast repositories of
declassified sources now reside online on governmental
and nongovernmental sites (see Connelly et al. 2020).
WikiLeaks might appear to offer yet another collection
of government documents, easily accessible and tempt-
ingly recent.
However, just on empirical grounds, even authentic
and comprehensive tranches of leaked documents
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present concerns. First, analysts must be careful not to
read too much into individual sources, as classification
implies neither accuracy nor authoritativeness and
memorandum authors are not omniscient or objective.
As retired diplomat Peter Galbraith (2011) explains,
cables are crafted to command scarce attention at the
State Department and perhaps the White House—
salacious details, jokes, criticism of host-government
officials, and narrative style are in, while truly sensitive
matters are kept out. Is an exposé of foreign corruption
factual, does it reflect embassy or US government
positions, or is it rhetorically designed to focus atten-
tion on actionable problems? Moreover, documents’
original classification may have talismanic appeal for
researchers: the higher the better, with greater implied
authority. These risks obtain with declassified docu-
ments too—but in archives, scholars can cross-
reference and contextualize arrays of contemporane-
ous sources.
Second, those documents comprise better evidence
for some questions than do others. Embassy cables, for
instance, are not a clear window into either US policy
making or political developments in host countries. If
leaked documents comprise one type or series (outgo-
ing cables, without internal memoranda or instruc-
tions), from one bureaucratic organization (State
Department), scholars obtain a very partial picture of
policy processes and perceptions. Thus, Robert Jervis
(2015) critiques studies of torture and harsh interroga-
tions based on CIA cables both for overreliance on a
single source and because much of the debate took
place orally and never made it into the files. Similarly,
Bob Woodward argues, WikiLeaks “has been really
overblown. Those documents are midlevel classifica-
tion. They have virtually no standing in the White
House, where decisions are made” (Glasser 2011).
Importantly, if scholars rationalize using leaked docu-
ments because of low-level classification, then their
sources do not reflect high-level decision making. Fur-
ther, focusing on one classification level might bias the
sample, as officials express different observations in
different settings.
Last, given legal and ethical concerns with leaked
documents, researchers analyzing such evidence should
explain why alternative sources are insufficient.
Scholars might argue that topics such as covert opera-
tions or ongoing trade negotiations have no methodo-
logical alternative to these materials. However, open
sources can yield major insights even on sensitive sub-
jects like targeted killings via drone strikes (Banka and
Quinn 2018). And regarding host-country political and
social conditions, diplomats’ classified reports are not
necessarily more accurate than, and frequently rely on,
local media. Richness is relative: the empirical value of
particular leaked materials for specific research ques-
tions needs to be argued, not just assumed.
DATA RELIABILITY
Provenance concerns not just theft, but fraud. First,
outright fabrication or manipulation of texts is worri-
some with electronic leaks, though unlikely in official
archives (Trachtenberg 2006, 146–7). Verification is
challenging because government officials are instructed
not to confirm or deny leaked information. In the
antiquities world, objects are often brokered by finan-
cially motivated, opaque entities, with rampant poten-
tial for forgery. Traffickers in looted goods are often
willing to sell fraudulent ones; scrupulous collectors
need consistently clean hands on both issues to pre-
serve their reputations.
Second, even if individual documents are intact,
selection effects are significant. If analysts do not know
what was inaccessible to leakers or not released by
them (or by intermediaries such asWikiLeaks or news-
papers), this skews inferences from the publicly avail-
able sample (see Gill and Spirling 2015). For instance,
when Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers, he
withheld volumes onUS-NorthVietnamese peace talks
and kept back, for decades, other classified material he
had illicitly photocopied at the same time (National
Archives 2011; Savage 2021).
Leak motivations matter, and WikiLeaks is an espe-
cially suspect source. As Michael Walzer (2018, 58)
argues, “In contrast to newspapers with long records
of public service, WikiLeaks is the wrong kind of
intermediary between a whistleblower and the Amer-
ican people,” with “narrowly partisan and personal
aims.” One study suggested that less than 10% of the
site’s documents came from leakers or whistleblowers,
almost 70% from hackers, and the remainder from
open sources and FOIA requests—and thatWikiLeaks
withheld Trump-related documents while releasing
Clinton material (Dorfman 2018). As unauthorized
sources’ authenticity and representativeness depends
on the choices and goals of leakers, hackers, and inter-
mediaries, researchers must consider not only empiri-
cal problems with the texts themselves but also the
ethical baggage they carry. Ultimately, even reliable
and useful data might not be worth employing.
LEGALITY
Determining how to analyze leaked documents is sec-
ondary: the fundamental problem is whether to engage
them at all. The US government’s position on
unauthorized disclosures is an important reference
point: Manning was convicted (and Assange indicted)
of violating the Espionage Act—disclosing classified
information without authorization makes one not sim-
ply a leaker but a spy. It is unclear, even if reading
leaked material does not constitute disclosure, whether
publication of excerpts or information from those doc-
uments does: Espionage Act provisions, construed
broadly, could encompass distribution (18 USC
37, §793, 798, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/
text/18/part-I/chapter-37). Consequences are more
likely and more extensive—including loss of employ-
ment or security clearances—for government officials
and contractors, including those in academic or
research positions, who are explicitly reminded not to
engage this material. One Foreign Policy commentator
refers to post-WikiLeaks surveillance of federal
employees as potential leakers or insider threats, by
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their peers and supervisors, as “Orwellian” and an
“inquisition” (Bamford 2016). This may be hyperbolic,
but it is not hypothetical.
Formal liability may be lower for others. As private
citizens, some scholars might see using publicly avail-
able material as minor, low-risk violations, akin to
jaywalking or violating broadcast-television copyright
notices. Society routinely distinguishes between johns
and pimps, narcotics possession and distribution, and
downloading music for personal use and operating file-
sharing servers—although participating in such mar-
kets entails complicity with suppliers. And national
laws vary: authors and journals outside the United
States might not worry about legal consequences from
Manning’s leaked documents.
The ethics consideration, though, is not just whether
research carries prosecutable consequences but
whether scholars should knowingly exploit and endorse
illegally obtained material or scrupulously avoid
it. Whether documents are governmental, corporate,
or personal, leaks and hacks generally mean dealing
with stolen goods (see journalist Neil Sheehan’s
recalled exchange, posthumously published, with Ells-
berg about the Pentagon Papers; Scott 2021). This
requires considering not just researchers’ home-
country laws but also the context of documents’ author-
ship, ownership, and disclosure. A global discipline
should advance global and reciprocal standards. APSA
(2020, 17–8; likewise Boustead and Herr 2020, 508)
guidelines permit research to cross legal lines, given
sufficient justification, so legal concerns are not auto-
matically paramount. However, they should be signif-
icant ethical considerations regarding leaked sources.
Hopefully no scholar would contemplate, as a
research strategy, hacking into government systems to
obtain classified documents. Why, then, are so many
researchers apparently comfortable citing unauthor-
ized material provided someone else stole it in the first
place? The analogy to burglary and receipt of stolen
property is uncomfortable but not farfetched. Many
colleagues, during fieldwork, have experienced con-
tacts or friends that helpfully but unofficially proffer
collections of physical or electronic documents (see
Lessing and Willis 2019). Before accessing leaked doc-
uments online, we might ask ourselves how confidently
we would carry them through a departure terminal
from their country of origin. Unprecedented and
unauthorized access may be exciting, but scholars
should tread carefully.
NATIONAL SECURITY
Classified documents present special concerns, as leaks
are not merely criminal but also harmful.
U.S. presidential executive orders and Office of Man-
agement and Budget guidance unambiguously declare
that leaked classified documents remain classified doc-
uments: unauthorized use and dissemination is illegal
and harms national security (Lew 2010; National
Archives 2009). Classification levels define the “dam-
age to the national security” (i.e., “harm to the national
defense or foreign relations”) that “reasonably could be
expected to result” from their disclosure, with Confi-
dential signifying “damage,” Secret “serious damage,”
and Top Secret “exceptionally grave damage”
(National Archives 2009). Posting such material online
neither constitutes, nor automatically produces, declas-
sification (2009). Moreover, the USGovernment treats
even some unclassified information as sensitive: Con-
trolled Unclassified Information designations let exec-
utive agencies restrict dissemination, such as
prohibiting release to foreign nationals, or identifying
categories of sensitive content such as genetic, infra-
structure, or nuclear information (National Archives
2019). Similarly, government employees watch for
“classification by compilation”: juxtaposing specific
pieces of information raises documents’ overall classi-
fication level; even some combinations of unclassified
information must jointly be classified (Information
Security Oversight Office 2018, 8).
There are reasons to doubt blanket assertions of
national security prerogatives for controlling informa-
tion access. Arguably, governments too often overclas-
sify information and resist freedom-of-information
requests (Aftergood 2011; Rudenstine 2016, 308–10;
Shapiro and Siegel 2010), sometimes even reclassifying
previously released material. Scholars might contend
that certain documents are “only” Confidential or
Secret; that materials are already available, with no
additional harm from further use and that others will
access it anyway; and that, years after particular disclo-
sures, security risks have evaporated. Harm and risk
might be small from specialized academic work with
limited readership—but this is hardly guaranteed, after
publication. And as GregoryWhitfield (2019 passim, at
534) astutely observes regarding experiments, the bio-
medical focus of human-subjects research guidance
leads political scientists to underestimate scholarly
risks, particularly “diffuse and groupwrongs” including
“violations of legitimate authority.” Even on the Pen-
tagon Papers, which the Supreme Court ultimately
ruled against preventing newspapers from printing,
theNixonAdministration presented legitimate security
concerns (Rudenstine 1998, 8–9, 327–9).
Moreover, scholars are unable to determine what
constitutes national security harm (even security clear-
ances do not convey that; it rests with an Original Clas-
sification Authority), especially because research
necessarily involves compilation. As we cross several
documents’ wires, insightful sparks emerge—which can
produce unintended consequences. Just because data are
already available, scholars should not assume that pros-
pects for additional harm have disappeared. By default,
protecting national security by forgoing unauthorized
information might simply be the right choice.
Researcherswhodisagree, rather thanarguing that schol-
arship is harmless, might consider weighing public-
interest benefits against legal or security externalities.
PUBLIC INTEREST
Norms and laws sometimes conflict: limited leaks to
protect human rights, correct abuses of power and
secrecy, and serve the public interest may be justifiable.
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Onemight proudly risk prosecution and imprisonment,
and engage with flawed intermediaries likeWikiLeaks,
to illuminate egregious wrongs. This reflects common
public conceptions of what whistleblowers do and foun-
dations of investigative journalism. However, the US
government distinguishes between whistleblowers,
whose disclosures are protected to combat waste, fraud,
and abuse (Shimabukuro and Whitaker 2012, 15–7),
and leakers of classified material, who criminally harm
national security. Debating which concept covers par-
ticular disclosures is reasonable, but we should not
collapse the distinction altogether. If public benefits
from particular projects drive evidentiary choices and
these outweigh normative concerns about law, security,
or privacy, then scholars should make this case openly.
Some might argue that uncovering government
secrets is intrinsically a normative good, whereby any-
thing that takes the national security state down a peg
should be encouraged. Governments’ insistence on
secrecy for themselves sounds hypocritical if they rou-
tinely compromise their citizens’ privacy and informa-
tion security. Disclosures from this perspective are
inevitable and desirable, and whatever emerges should
become public domain, covered by academic freedom.
In a 1980s hacker mantra, “information wants to be
free” (Brand 1987, 204). If researchers’ value beliefs
categorically legitimize leaked material, they should
disclose this vital point of reflexivity.
For many analysts, though, leaks’ context and intent
matter. Even if scholars perceive some leakers as whis-
tleblowers, that does not necessarily legitimize sources
like the Cablegate tranche that are massive rather than
targeted and not designed to expose particular govern-
mental abuses—especially if documents are then used
for research that is further removed from uncovering
wrongdoing or achieving concrete public benefits. This
is different from the Pentagon Papers case (Ellsberg
2002, 289–95) and perhaps Manning’s leak of the “war
diaries.” (A more acute debate concerns leaks by for-
mer National Security Agency contractor Edward
Snowden, which apparently involved more highly clas-
sified sources, with declared public interest in revealing
US domestic surveillance overreach but ultimately
benefiting American adversaries including Russia and
China.)
Likewise, not all research projects realistically con-
tribute enough to the public good to outweigh ethical
concerns about using leaked material. Some benefits
from analyzing particular data accrue privately to
researchers such as information, validation of valued
arguments, and resulting professional publications. For
the public, though, most research projects make incre-
mental contributions to general knowledge. Generic
claims of academic freedomdo not sufficiently establish
ethical foundations for research with leaked docu-
ments, which ought to clear high hurdles of real-world
significance. Here, broadly positivist scholars might
take cues from colleagues in critical security studies
on emancipation, human rights and democracy promo-
tion, or racial justice and gender equality (inter alia,
Shepherd 2013). If research has a designed purpose and
benefit, that may not justify all means andmethods, but
it should weigh in those judgments, especially if the
normative intent of the research and the motivation
and scope of the leak are aligned.
POLICY RELEVANCE
Engagement with leaks complicates the pursuit of pol-
icy relevance. International relations scholarship has
long maintained ambivalent relations with policy mak-
ing (Avey and Desch 2014; Nincic and Lepgold 2000),
and political science with American government
(Smith 1997), and leaks may exacerbate these tensions.
(Relevance is not just about policy, let alone US gov-
ernment policy, andmay even oppose it [Sjoberg 2015],
so I treat public interest separately.) One might argue
that using the hottest, most recent materials enhances
relevance (Elias 2018, 235). And as Stephen Walt
(2011, 53) suggested, WikiLeaks may have “fostered
greater transparency and made the marketplace of
ideas somewhat more efficient” for enhancing policy
debate. However, leaks can breed further information
lockdowns rather than trust and sunlight. Scholars
might have difficulty contributing to policy discussion
after participating in, or endorsing, security breaches. It
is hard to speak truth to power when shut out of certain
information, but deliberation also suffers when officials
with security clearances cannot listen or respond
because of how researchers’ information was acquired.
However, governments often encourage research
with documents wrested from their adversaries.
National Archives collections contain captured state
records, including more than 70,000 rolls of microfilm
reproducing documents from Nazi Germany and other
Axis powers (National Archives 2016). Similarly, the
Iraqi Ba’ath Party files now at the Hoover Institution
and the Al-Qaeda and Iraqi files that were available at
the now-shuttered Conflict Records Research Center
(CRRC, 2005–2010, at the National Defense Univer-
sity at Ft. McNair), were also products of conquest
rather than consent (ABC7 2008; Cox 2010; Gordon
2015). Scholars are privy to troves of Japanese and
German official communications from World War II
and Soviet records from the Cold War that passed
through the hands of American and British intelligence
agencies (Andrew and Mitrokhin 1999; Steil 2013).
In this time of declared great power competition,
Washington might well be interested in analyses of
Chinese regime security decision making and domestic
propaganda operations based on leaked or hacked
documents (King, Pan, and Peters 2017; Nathan
2019). The US Government might encourage or even
sponsor such research—but from an ethics standpoint,
that can hardly be the end of the conversation, as
original governmental authors (or their successors)
might see these seizures as illegitimate. Reciprocally,
leaked US documents might enable policy-relevant
research from the perspective of both adversaries and
allies, for instance in European journals. Relevance
involves trade-offs, and decisions to exploit or forgo
certain leaked files build norms about future disclo-
sures’ legitimacy.
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HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTION
Even robust public-interest or policy-relevant asser-
tions for document access confront human-subjects
protection rationales for keeping certain information
private. Leaked documents violate basic expectations
of confidentiality and consent. Government officials
know that much of their work ultimately joins the
public record but communicate freely and effectively
in classified or restricted channels knowing that
decades will pass before mandatory declassification
and that earlier FOIA requests would be carefully
vetted, perhaps with redactions. (Even declassified
archival documents containing personal information
are often off-limits to researchers.) Diplomatic cables
report on bilateral relationships, including frank con-
versations with host-government leaders and societal
informants such as dissidents or members of vulnerable
groups, all of whom anticipate confidentiality. Many
US cables explicitly mark named interlocutors as
“strictly protect” (a handling instruction separate from
classification) because of harm that disclosure could
cause them. Intelligence files have further issues if
information about individuals was itself gathered non-
consensually (see Subotić 2021). Documents taken
from governments do not only affect the state or amor-
phous, collective national security; they can also dam-
age real people.
Boustead and Herr (2020) suggest that authors han-
dling documentary sources apply the Belmont princi-
ples (US Department of Health 1979) that undergird
human-subjects research (HSR): respect for persons,
beneficence, and justice. For instance, withholding per-
sonally identifiable information by anonymizing
research participants guards against risks they might
face after publication. This parallels many ethno-
graphic researchers’ resistance to inflexible transpar-
encymandates regarding sensitive interview transcripts
and field notes (Büthe and Jacobs 2015). If researchers
employ leaked sources, these recommendations are
valuable for harm reduction. But as Subotić (2021,
343, 348–9) argues, archival researchers’ ethical obliga-
tions to other individuals’ “dignity, humanity, and
voice” transcend the Belmont guidelines and should
extend to research staff, deceased persons (especially
victims of violence or those whose records reflect coer-
cion), and surviving communities.
Focusing on HSR procedural safeguards is mislead-
ing. First, we may overestimate harm-reduction capac-
ity. Anonymization is not foolproof: vast human-
subjects datasets risk “reidentification” and loss of
confidentiality as researchers connect the dots
(Zimmer 2010). Anonymizing published quotations
offers little protection if underlying documents are
hyperlinked or discoverable. Second, HSR’s biomedi-
cal and experimental assumptions do not capture the
range of ethical concerns with leaked documents,
including institutional harms (see Whitfield 2019).
Third, the Belmont “beneficence” principle suggests
higher standards than merely to do no harm: even for
minimal-risk projects, researchers should consider
whether they actually provide public benefits,
especially to populations being studied. Fourth, the
HSR lensmight downplay the disciplinary community’s
oversight responsibilities, burden-shift onto IRBs, and
emphasize momentary compliance and approval
instead of researchers’ ongoing ethical practice (see
Fujii 2012; Israel 2015; Marzano 2012, 80–1).
Finally, prioritizing safeguards during research dis-
tracts from the underlying problem of source legiti-
macy. Scholars must explain why consensual methods
and data were insufficient and defend the public value
of the research against its potential harms (seeMarzano
2012, 81–2, 87). HSR prioritizes protecting vulnerable
populations, and governments are hardly weak, so
power relations affect research legitimacy, and it mat-
ters whose information is being seized (82–3, 89). How-
ever, Belmont principles should cover the people
entangledwith governmental and corporate documents
and apply, as scholarly values, across research domains.
Analyzing sources taken against the will of their
authors (and other participants and reported-on third
parties), makes researchers complicit in violations after
the fact. Even if scholars avoid new individual harms,
reliance on unauthorized materials undermines the
ethical principles on which human-subjects protections
depend.
REFLEXIVITY
The possibility of value-neutral social science is an
eternal debate, but unauthorized sources make it espe-
cially acute. Borrowing from Robert Cox (1981, 128),
sources and methods may not be “always for someone
and for some purpose,” but decisions to analyze or
forgo leaked documents certainly are. There is no easy
way to avoid complicity: on Cablegate, scholars’ meth-
odological choices tacitly either support US Govern-
ment efforts to keep secrets or endorse other actors’
attempts to reveal these. Scholars might not want to
associate themselves broadly with the actions and
objectives of any government or of nonstate hackers,
leakers, and brokers likeWikiLeaks. However, citation
choices are weighty: sources and analyses compromise
some interests and benefit others. There is moral haz-
ard too: the values we prioritize affect scholarly norms
and incentivize individual decisions. Repeatedly avoid-
ing or downplaying these choices, affirms the positions
taken most loudly or often. Political scientists need to
send stronger, clearer signals about whether we will
provide amarket for future leaks and how scrupulously
we take the provenance of our data. As interpretivist
scholars argue, how we approach our sources says
something about who we are, and who we are affects
our research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 38–40,
66–8, 95–104). Prominent, explicit reflexivity is an
important criterion for establishing research legitimacy
amid the challenges of leaked documents.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Scholars will likely rank-order these conflicting values
according to their own judgments. However, I offer
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four suggested guidelines to weigh criterial trade-offs,
avoid the “relativistic swamp” (Gerring 2001, 26–7),
and chart reliable research courses amid the challenges
of unauthorized, nonconsensual, or outright stolen evi-
dence.
First, when in doubt, leave it out. Illegality or classi-
fication may not always bar investigative scholarship,
but they are significant deterrents alongside complicity,
reliability, and other concerns. Unless authors persua-
sively justify the necessity of tainted sources, accuracy
of inferences from them, and public-interest value of
the findings, they should probably shy away.
Second, access requires commitment. If researchers
treat leaked material as an archive like any other, they
are accountable for doing it justice, which invariably
requires more than a citation or two. Even small claims,
backed by primary sources, require scrutinizing those
documents’ original communicative context and asses-
sing biases in source repositories and in researchers’
sampling and interpretation of particular texts, as well
as ethical concerns. With the proliferation of online
sources, ease of access should not imply ease of analy-
sis.
Third, do trust journalists, but don’t touch their
sources. It would be unreasonable and impractical to
avoid news articles based on leaks and later work citing
these as “fruit of the poisonous tree” (inadmissible
evidence from illegal searches). Because professional
journalists and editors use ethical filters (including the
balanced primacy of public interest) to present narra-
tives, with excerpted evidence, scholars can trust and
quote the paper of record. Meanwhile, scholarly
restraint from rifling the “bran tub” of leaked docu-
ments curtails complicity with existing disclosures,
removes the moral hazard from future ones by for-
swearing research access to unauthorized information
except where narrated by reputable journalists, and
reduces the burden of defending our work’s risks and
benefits. Conversely, circumventing journalistic filters
to access leaked documents requires shouldering
responsibility to vet source legitimacy and reliability,
weigh public interests, and mitigate individual and
institutional harms.
Fourth, disclose, defend, and debate. Transparency
should be a watchword not merely for empirical
purposes of fact-checking and replication, or prevent-
ing error or fraud, but because individual choices
about sources and methods have ethical dimensions
and the accumulation of those decisions builds com-
munity norms. Responsibility lies not just with authors
using leaked or hacked sources to justify their
approach but also with other scholars to explain
why they avoided those documents (e.g., Poor 2017).
Journals, associations, advisors, and reviewers should
do more to clarify scholarly principles and standards
for publishable work.
CONCLUSION
This paper examined the problem of nonconsensually
obtained evidence in political science and international
relations, focusing on the case of leaked classified
documents. When sources are essentially stolen—
whether through insider leaks or external hacks—and
disseminated without permission, scholars face both
ethical and methodological dilemmas. Researchers
considering such sources must confront documents’
uncertain integrity and legality, the challenges of ana-
lyzing and the consequences of publishing their con-
tents, and their own professional values and project
objectives. This paper seeks to stimulate disciplinary
debate and individual reflection on these issues. Ulti-
mately, I argue that the hazards from this research,
from national-security harms and eroding human-
subjects protections to scholarly complicity with rogue
actors, generally outweigh the benefits and that excep-
tions and justifications need to be articulated much
more explicitly and forcefully than is customary in
existing work.
To establish the scope of the issue, I demonstrated
that published scholarly use of leaked documents is
widespread and opaque. All 20 TRIP-ranked journals
have published such articles, but most articles using
leaked diplomatic cables do not disclose this promi-
nently and none explicitly addresses the legality of
classified material. Reliance on leaked documents is
rife, but open discussion of ethical and empirical pitfalls
is rare.
Researchers need to do better but also deserve
clearer guidance. Thus, I argued that incomplete
and inconsistent guidelines from leading political sci-
ence and international relations journals and associa-
tions provide an underdeveloped foundation for
assessing source legitimacy. I outlined provenance as
the primary concept for approaching this issue more
systematically, and I reviewed how disciplines from
journalism to statistics to paleontology address the
origins of their evidence, highlighting several reasons
to refrain from analyzing nonconsensual sources.
Because unilateral rule making will not resolve fun-
damental ethical dilemmas, I presented eight criteria
to help scholars sharpen provenance debates and
assess whether and how to analyze leaked documents,
plus four recommendations to balance intrinsic trade-
offs among those criteria.
This approach suggests intellectual humility as a
unifying principle. Scholars should avoid four forms
of arrogance: entitlement to sources, straightforward
inference from them, confidence in public value and
minimal harm, and assumption that readers share our
values and need no persuasion or will not notice or
mind our methods. Readers exploring the museum
gallery of our evidence and citations should be encour-
aged to ask why a particular piece is hanging on the
wall, where it originated, and how it was obtained and
to reassess our broader collection and analytical con-
tribution in that light. Ethical dilemmas and methodo-
logical best practices evolve swiftly, and critiques of the
field should stop short of chastising individual scholars
or decreeing universal rules. However, I encourage
more rigorous introspection and deliberation on disci-
plinary practices before the next leak—and there is
always another one—puts us to the test.
The Provenance Problem: Research Methods and Ethics in the Age of WikiLeaks
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